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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 18314 
CHARLES T. BROWN, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a conviction of aggravated kid-
napping. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged with forcible sexual abuse and 
aggravated kidnapping and tried before a jury on the 20th day 
of January, 1982, the Honorable Duffy Palmer, Second District 
Court Judge, presiding. The jury convicted appellant on the 
kidnapping charge and acquitted him on the charge of forcible 
sexual abuse. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and asks for 
a new trial. 
1 
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FACTS 
The largest part of the testimony in this case centered 
around Gale Kuki, the alleged victim. She testified that during 
the preceding two and a half to three years she had an affair 
with the appellant. (T.R. 25) She testified that on the day 
before the incident in question she had gone to Logan to pick 
up her granddaughter with a Mr. Dan Thompson. She returned at 
approximately 5:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M. that evening to her 
mother's house. At that time she stated she received several 
phone calls from the appellant inquiring as to when she expected 
to return home (T.R. 27). Ms. Kuki then went to Mr. Thompson's 
house with him. The appellant called at Mr. Thompson's and was 
invited over. (T.R. 27) The appellant arrived andthe complainant 
left shortly thereafter to return home. On the way she was 
stopped by a police officer for suspicion of driving under the 
influence and then released (T.R. 28). 
According to the alleged victim, she arrived at home 
and the appellant was inside her mobile home, a fact which the 
appellant denied. An argument ensued and Ms. Kuki testified 
that she was physically assaulted, She testified that the fight 
lasted continuously for approximately four hours, during which 
time she left the mobile home once to run next door (T.R. 33). 
She stated the appellant forced her back to her mobile home where 
the fight continued. 
2 
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somewhat from what she observed at the scene. 
Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the 
photographs on the grounds that (1) They did not accurately 
depict the observations of Ms. Johnson, and (2) Any probative 
value was outweighed by the prejudice to the Defendant. The 
photographs were admitted. (T.R. 31). 
The defense called Barbara Brown, the appellant's 
wife to the stand. Mrs. Brown testified as to a long history 
of harassment by Ms. Kuki. 
The appellant testified in his own behalf. The appell-
ant testified of a long and stormy relationship with Ms. Kuki, 
lasting two and one-half to three years. He stated that on the 
night the incident occurred he arrived at Ms. Kuki's mobile 
home after she had arrived. He said that they were to prepare 
for a fishing trip the next day. They talked for approximately 
one hour before an argument began (T.R. 157). He testified that 
Ms. Kuki threw a glass and then slapped him while he sat in a 
chair. A pushing match ensued and appellant's shoulder was 
injured. Appellant admitted that he bit Ms. Kuki in an effort 
to gain his release (T.R. 163). At some point the situation 
calmed and appellant left. He was arrested later that morning. 
Defense counsel requested that the court instruct the 
jury as to simple assault, alleging it to be a lesser included 
offense to the charge of aggravated kidnapping, as well as self-
4 
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defense. The court refused and appellant's counsel excepted 
(T.R. 107). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY AS TO SELF-DEFENSE. 
Defense counsel requested that the judge instruct the 
jury on the theory of self defense (T.R. 107). Such request was 
denied and the jury was given no instruction dealing with self 
defense. Utah Code Annotated S 76-2-402 provides that: 
A person is justified in threatening or using 
force against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes that such a force is 
necessary to defend himself or a third person 
against such other's inuninent use of unlawful 
force. 
Generally, if evidence is introduced at trial which would 
raise the issue of self defense, an instruction is required. In a 
leading case, although the instruction was not given, this court 
discussed the standard to be applied in determining whether to 
instruct the jury on a self defense theory. 
If the defendant's evidence, although in material 
conflict with the State's proof, be such that the 
jury may entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether 
or not he acted in self-defense, he is entitled to 
have the jury instructed fully and clearly on the 
law of self-defense. Conversely, if all reasonable 
men must conclude that the evidence is so slight 
as to be incapable of raising a reasonable doubt in 
the jury's mind as to whether a defendant accused of 
a crime acted in self-defense, tendered instructions 
thereon are properly refused. 
State v, Castillo, 457, P.2d 618,619 (Utah 1968) 
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In the case before the court the evidence concerning 
self defense came mainly from two sources. The appellant 
testified extensively about the aggression by Ms. Kuki (T.R. 
157-163). He stated that she slapped him, threw and broke a 
glass, pushed him, and severely injured his shoulder, which he 
said she knew to be injury prone. He stated that the actions 
he took were in response to her acts. Additionally, Detective 
Ball stated that appellant, in a statement made the morning 
after the incident, told Ball essentially the same story 
(T. R. 116) . 
There is no question that this is in material conflict 
with the state's evidence. However, it was at least substantial 
enough and credible enough, to entitle appellant to the instruct-
ion. It should be noted in this regard that the "victim", Ms. 
Kuki admitted to striking appellant several times, and to tearing 
his shirt, indicating some force, although she characterizes her 
actions as defensive (T.R. 73). 
This court has stated the rule in a different way in 
State v. Johnson, 112U.130,185 P.2d 738 (1947). After reviewing 
many previous cases the court noted that in cases where the 
defendant's request for instructions was sustained, defendant's 
evidence established a state of facts which, if believed by the 
jury, established adequate provocation, lawful acts on the part 
of the defendant, or other facts justifying defendant's actions. 
6 
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In other words, if the evidence offered is believed, defendant 
could conceivably make out his defense and the jury should be 
instructed accordingly. 
In this case, had the jury been properly instructed and 
had they believed the testimony of the appellant, a jury could 
have seriously entertained a reasonable doubt as to whether or 
not appellant acted in self-defense, and there can be no question 
that failure to instruct the jury in this regard is reversible 
error, where the jury is precluded from even considering the 
evidence and theory of the defendant. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ASSAULT 
WITH RESPECT TO THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING. 
Defense counsel requested that the court instruct the 
jury as to simple assault, arguing that it was a lesser included 
offense of aggravated kidnapping. Two Utah statutes govern 
whether a defense instruction as to a lesser included offense 
will be given, Section 77-33-6 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, states: 
The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense 
the conunission of which is necessarily included in 
that which he is charged in the indictment of in-
formation, or of any attempt to connnit the offense. 
Section 76-1-402 (4), U.C.A. provides that: 
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury 
with respect to an included offense unless there is 
a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. 
7 
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This court has restated this rule in State v. Dougherty, 
550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976). Discussing with approval principles 
laid down in a Nevada case, Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 414 
P. 2d 593 (1966), this court stated that 
if there be any evidence, however slight, on any 
reasonable theory of the case under which the 
defendant might be convicted of a lesser included 
offense, the court must, if requested, give an 
appropriate instruction. Lisby v. State, supra 
at 177. 
The court in Lisby v. State, supra, discussed three 
categories of cases wherein the question of giving lesser in-
eluded instructions arose. First, cases wherein there is evidence 
which would absolve defendant from the greater offense, or degree, 
but would support a finding of guilt on the lesser offense. In 
such cases the instruction is mandatory. Second, cases where 
the elements differ or evidence shows that defendant is not guilty 
of the lesser crime, wherein the instruction is inappropriate. 
Third, a situation where the greater crime necessarily includes 
all elements of the lesser crime, where the greater crime could 
not be committed without having the intent and doing the acts 
which constitute the lesser crime. In such cases the instru-
ction should be given unless the state has conclusively proved 
the greater crime and there is no evidence which would tend to 
reduce the greater offense, if believed by the jury. 
This case would seem to fall within the third category, 
specifically, that all of the elements of assault are included 
8 
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able, a proper foundation must be made and the pictures must 
be shown not to be misleading Kaps Transport, Inc. v. Henry, 
572 P. 2d 72 (Alaska 1977). That test was not met in this case. 
Further, Ms. Johnson went on to give value judgments about the 
photographs. This clearly undermines the purpose behind the 
authentication requirements and the photos should have been 
excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts as presented at trial clearly raised the 
issue of self defense, both by the defense and state witnesses. 
The court erred in removing this aspect of the trial from con-
sideration by not properly instructing the jury. As the ele-
ments of aggravated kidnapping overlapped the elements of 
assault, and as the evidence raised doubts as to guilt on the 
greater offense, the court should have instructed the jury on 
the lesser included offense. Finally, the court should not have 
admitted photographic evidence which, admittedly, did not 
accurately depict what it was represented to show. By taking 
the major portion of the defense theory away from the jury, the 
court committed reversible error and the conviction for aggra-
vated kidnapping must be reversed and appellant granted a new 
trial. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
within the elements of aggravated kidnapping. 
The elements of the assault instruction which defense 
counsel urged on the court are as follows: 
1. an attempt; 
2. with unlawful force or violence; 
3. to do bodily injury to another. U.C.A. 76-5-102 
The elements of aggravated kidnapping, as applicable 
to this case are: 
1. intentional and knowingly; 
2. by force, threat or deceit; 
3. detains or restrains another against his will with 
intent; 
4. to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another. (U.C,A. 76-5-302) 
A bare reading and comparison of these elements reveals 
that it will be almost impossible to sustain a conviction of 
aggravated kidnapping without also proving all of the elements 
of assault. Furthermore, the previous discussion of the facts 
clearly shows that the evidence presented required the court to 
give the instruction as requested. 
There was a dispute in the evidence as to whether or not 
Ms. Kuki was detained or restrained against her will. She test-
ified that she was restrained, while the appellant denied that was 
the case. No other testimony or evidence was offered. 
In analyzing the elements it can be seen that if the 
jury had a reasonable doubt as to the question of restraint, but 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they were satisfied as to the remaining elements, an assault, 
as defined above, would be proved. Thus, according to the 
applicable statutes and case law, it was error on the part 
of the lower court to refuse to instruct the jury as to assault, 
a lesser included offense. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PHOTOGRAPHS, 
AS THEY DID NOT ACCURATELY DEPICT THE OBSERVATIONS 
OF THE VICTIM. 
The state at trial introduced several photographs of 
Ms. Kuki, taken the morning after the incident (state's Exhibits 
D through J). The items were authenticated by Virginia Johnson, 
a secretary of the Layton Police Department, who took the photo-
graphs. She testified that Exhibits D through J were not the 
same photographs she took, but were enlargements, apparently made 
by the county attorney, who checked them out of evidence. She 
was also the evidence officer and did not see them until they 
were shown to her at trial. 
When asked whether the photographs accurately depicted 
what she observed, she stated they did not, that they differed 
somewhat. 
The general rule is that before photographs can be admiss-
able they must be shown to be fair, accurate and truthful represen-
tations of what they purport to depict. Ross v. Colorado National 
Bank of Denver, 463 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1969). In order to be ad.miss-
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered 2 copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney 
Ge~:8/Pi· 236 Stat~:to~ Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
~day of ~ft1 ,1983. 
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